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ABSTRACT
Many legal economists suggest that the common law
system spurs more economic growth than the civil law
system. The legal origins movement popularized this
theory. From the perspective of such literature, the
existence of hybrid, pluralist or mixed legal jurisdictions
is a puzzle. Why has civil law persisted while common
law is more efficient?
This paper discusses the efficiency of the common law
hypothesis from the perspective of hybrid jurisdictions.
We argue that the complexities of legal systems require a
more nuanced analysis. The consequence is that there is
no single efficient outcome, thus undermining the "one-
size-fits-all" theory of the legal origins literature.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal economists in the last decade have popularized the legal
origins literature.' They have emphasized the superiority of the common
law system over French civil law (while absolving German and
Scandinavian civil law from a similar fate).2 This perspective has become
popular in legal scholarship as well as in legal policy making.'
This new literature contends that legal institutions descended
from English common law have superior institutions for economic
growth and development as compared to those of French civil law.'
Legal economists give two arguments. First, common law provides more
adequate institutions for financial markets and business transactions
more generally, and that, in turn, fuels more economic growth.' Second,
French civil law presupposes a greater role for state intervention and that
intervention is detrimental for economic freedom and market efficiency.'
Some legal economists have traced the alleged superiority of the
common law to the Posnerian hypothesis of the efficiency of the
common law.7 Judge Posner introduced this controversial thesis in the
first edition of his seminal book.' He posited that the common law
contained an implicit economic logic.9 In his view, the doctrines in
common law provide a coherent and consistent system of incentives
See generally Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be
Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001); see generally Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes
& Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285
(2008); see generally Gani Aldashev, Legal Institutions, Political Economy, and Development,
25 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 257 (2009). A more recent paper finds the opposite result when
focusing on the quality of the court system. See Frank B. Cross & Dain C. Donelson, Creating
Quality Courts, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 490, 490 (2010) (concluding common law is
negatively correlated to the quality of courts in Europe).
2 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and
Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1116 (1998).
3 In particular, under the auspices of some programs associated with the World Bank. See, e.g.,
Vivian Grosswald Curran, Comparative Law and the Legal Origins Thesis: "[NJon scholae sed
vitae discimus ", 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 863, 863-864, 875 (2009).
4 See KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 32-34 (2006); see also Mark J. Roe & Jordan 1. Siegel, Finance and Politics: A
Review Essay Based on Kenneth Dam's Analysis of Legal Traditions in The Law-Growth Nexus,
47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 781, 797-98 (2009).
5 'See La Porta et al,, supra note 1, at 298.
6 See Mahoney, supra note 1, at 521.
See Nuno Garoupa & Carlos G6mez Ligierre, The Syndrome of the Efficiency of the Common
Law, 29 B.U. INT'L L.J. 287, 293 (2011).
8 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 98-101 (1st ed. 1972).
9 Id. at 98.
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which induce efficient behavior, not merely in explicit markets, but in all
social contexts (the so-called implicit markets)."0 For example, common
law reduces transaction costs to favor market transactions when
appropriate."
Previous work has debunked the relationship between the
Posnerian hypothesis and the legal origins movement. 2 We have argued
that even if the common law is efficient in the Posnerian sense, further
underlying assumptions are needed to conclude that civil law is less
conducive to economic growth than common law. 3 We have also
highlighted that given the significant variations within the common law
world, it is unclear what we mean by evolution to an efficient outcome. 4
The main concern with the legal origins theory is the implicit
assumption of a "one-size-fits-all" solution to institutional design.
Previously, we identified the methodological problem with such an
approach. In our view, such theory is based on a selected "cherry-
picking" of legal doctrines and macro-generalizations that lack a serious
theoretical framework. 5 We have articulated our skepticism concerning
the possibility of a sophisticated theory to sustain the superiority of the
common law legal family. 6
Legal systems are not randomly distributed around the world. 7
Most jurisdictions inherit their legal system from an invader, an occupier,
or a colonial power.' Few countries have actually chosen their legal
system as the outcome of a conscious debate over the existing
possibilities. 9 The standard examples are Japan, Thailand and the
Ottoman Empire, countries that by the end of the nineteenth century,
favored civil law (German in the first case and French in the last two
'0 See id. at 98-100.
" Id. at 99.
12 See Garoupa & G6mez Ligfierre, supra note 7, at 288.
13 Id.
14 Nuno Garoupa & Carlos G6mez Ligilerre, The Evolution of the Common Law and Efficiency, 40
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 15) (on file with authors).
15 See Garoupa & G6mez Liguerre, supra 7, at 288.
16 Garoupa & G6mez LigUerre, supra note 14, at 19; See also JAN SMITS, Introduction: Mixed
Legal Systems and European Private Law, in SYSTEMS TO EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 1, 5 (2001).
17 See UGO A. MATrEI, TEEMU RUSKOLA & ANTONIO GIDI, SCHLESINGER'S COMPARATIVE LAW
223-47 (7th ed. 2009).
I8 See generally Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, Economic
Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165, 168-69 (2003).
19 For an overview, see generally KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO
COMPARATIVE LAW 74-319 (Tony Weir trans., Oxford Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2008) (1977).
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cases) over available alternatives at the time.2" The reasons for their
choice had less to do with economic efficiency, and more to do with the
perception of the fast growing French and later German power (military
more than economic) and modernization.2'
However, at the same time, one can hardly think that legal
systems are merely correlated with the particular dominant culture.22 In
fact, being simplistic but nevertheless informative, Britain colonized the
areas of the world that were relevant from the perspective of their
economic and military interests23. The remaining European powers were
essentially left with the regions that the British did not want.24 Britain
defeated all competing European colonial powers at one stage or another,
so common law was developed in places Britain perceived to be
important areas of the world. Civil law was constrained and limited to
regions that were not perceived significant for British interests. 6 As a
consequence, the distribution of legal systems is necessarily correlated
with British imperial perceptions of relevance.27 And these perceptions
are inevitably correlated with potential economic growth, thus creating a
serious technical problem to the econometric estimations of the legal
origins movement.28
Some areas of the world were initially colonized by European
countries that have civil law (although in some cases their civil law
20 See HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 13-20 (3d ed. 2009). The Ottoman Empire slowly shifted to
German civil law and adopted a civil code inspired by the Swiss model in 1926. See Ruth A.
Miller, The Ottoman and Islamic Substratum of Turkey's Swiss Civil Code, 11 J. ISLAMIC STUD.
335,335 (2000) (Eng.).
21 See ODA, supra note 20, at 15; see also CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 20-23 (2d rev. ed,, 2008).
22 See Berkowitz et. al., supra note 18, at 180.
23 See generally PHILIPPA LEVINE, THE BRITISH EMPIRE: SUNRISE TO SUNSET (2007).
24 See id. at 43.
25 The Portuguese and Spanish decline after the 1600s benefited primarily the British. The Dutch
empire was largely contained by the British when William III became King (1688). The British
defeated the French at the Seven Year's War and the Treaty of Paris (1763) transferred most
relevant parts of the French colonial empire to the British. Britain was the major winner of the
Berlin conference (1885) where Africa was partitioned among the European powers. The defeat
of Germany, Austria and the Ottoman Empire in 1918 benefited the British and the French. See
generally PHILIPPA LEVINE, THE BRITISH EMPIRE: SUNRISE TO SUNSET (2007); see also
LAWRENCE JAMES, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 15, 51, 54, 94, 288, 395-
397(1995).
26 See generally Levine, supra note 23.
27 See Daniel M. Klerman, Paul G. Mahoney, Holger Spamann & Mark Weinstein, Legal Origin or
Colonial History?, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS (forthcoming 201 1)(manuscript at 1) (Eng.).
2' Id. at 11.
674
Efficiency of the Common Law
predates the nineteenth century codification).29 Due to the strategic role
they played for the interests of the British Empire, Britain eventually
defeated other European powers and acquired these territories.30
Consequently these parts of the globe were subject to common law in a
second wave of legal transplants.3' In not a single case have we seen
common law fully obliterating the civil law past.32 In some jurisdictions,
the civil law past has faded with time and is tenuously reflected in
current legal institutions, the most obvious examples are the American
Southern states.3 However, in the vast majority of these jurisdictions, the
civil law and the common law have coexisted.34 Comparativists loosely
refer to these institutional arrangements as mixed jurisdictions.3"
In this paper we take a different approach from our previous
work. We focus on mixed, pluralist or hybrid jurisdictions. These are
jurisdictions that mix elements of civil law and common law (and
eventually elements from a third legal system). Given the alleged
superiority of the common law system, one should expect the civil law to
fade away. Moreover, the common law being the legal system of the
later, stronger colonizer or occupier, we should suppose the civil law to
be in a difficult position to survive.36 Such predictions are, broadly
speaking, inconsistent with reality. We discuss the reasons for that with
an economic model.
First, the paper discusses the conceptualization of mixed or
hybrid legal systems. Second, we discuss an economic model to explain
the sustainability of hybrid solutions. Finally, we conclude with final
remarks.
29 See VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD LEGAL
FAMILY 18-20 (2001).
30 See id.
3' Id. at 19.
32 See id at 19-21.
33 See Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, American Civil Law Origins: Implications for State
Constitutions, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 62, 62 (2005); Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, The Effect
of Judicial Independence on Courts: Evidence from the American States, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 399,
399 (2006).
34 See PALMER, supra note 29, at 18-20.
" Id. at 11.
36 Id. at 21-22 (providing a historical characterization of the common law having a stronger
position).
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II. MIXED JURISDICTIONS AND MIXED LEGAL FAMILIES
The comparative law literature does not provide for any precise
definition of a mixed jurisdiction. The reason is that probably all
jurisdictions are mixed in the sense that they are informed by indigenous
legal tradition and transplants in relevant areas of the law." Jurisdictions
interact for multiple reasons and, as a consequence, conscious or not, by
statute, by case law, or by legal practice, are influenced by other
jurisdictions.3" If every jurisdiction is mixed, then the classification of
legal families must be based on a matter of degree. 39
The first distinction is between those jurisdictions that mix legal
systems in a systematic way and those that do not.4 ° Within the
jurisdictions that do not mix legal systems in a systematic way, we
include the vast majority of the world that is usually affiliated to a
particular legal family. They occasionally and opportunistically
transplant laws and legal institutions from a different legal family, but
overall they follow a particular dominant tradition." Obviously such
classification does not come without problems. Nevertheless, it fits with
37 Jacques Du Plessis, Comparative Law and the Study of Mixed Legal Systems, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 478, 478 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds.,
2006) ("Legal systems generally are 'mixed' in the sense that they have been influenced by a
variety of other systems. However, traditionally the term 'mixed' is only used to describe a
relatively small group of legal systems or jurisdictions which have been shaped so significantly
by both the civil law and common law traditions that they cannot be brought home comfortably
under either. Thus, as far as their substantive law is concerned, key areas of the private law in
many of these systems are predominantly civilian (in some it is even codified), whereas
commercial law quite often strongly bears the imprint of the common law. And while public law
in general has been strongly influenced by the common law, aspects of the criminal law, and
more recently even constitutional law, at times display civilian features. Procedurally, these
systems have in turn generally adopted a common law approach to adjudication: the judge is at
the forefront of legal development, and precedent is generally regarded as binding and as more
authoritative than academic writings."). See also Esin Oricti, What is a Mixed Legal System:
Exclusion or Expansion?, 12 ELEC. J. COMPARATIVE L. 1, 1 (2008) (observing that current
European legal systems are better seen as overlaps rather than pure common law or civil law
since contamination exists and borrowing has been the practice of legal development).
38 See generally Nuno Garoupa & Anthony Ogus, A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants,
35 J. LEGAL STUD. 339, 342 (2006) (Eng.).
39 See Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal Systems, 45
AM. J. COMP. L. 5, 8-10 (1997); Andrew Harding, Global Doctrine and Local Knowledge: Law
in South East Asia, 51 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 35, 49 (2002) (making the argument that the
standard distinction common vs. civil law is inappropriate to understand Asian legal systems);
Oroct, supra note 37, at 1 (discussing alternative models of classification).
40 See H Patrick Glenn, Quebec: Mixitj and Monism, in STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: MIXED AND
MIXING 1, 1 (Esin Oriicii, Elspeth Attwooll & Sean Coyle eds., 1996).
41 Id.
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the traditional division between civil and common law legal families. 2
The focus of our article is on those jurisdictions that combine legal
systems in a systematic way and therefore cannot be regarded as either
civil or common law.
A second important distinction is between those jurisdictions that
have a structured mix and those that have an unstructured mix. 43 By
unstructured mixed legal system, comparativists understand an overlap
of two traditions, with no clear or evident application of one or the other
to all legal subjects.' There is no formal articulation or coordination
between the two legal traditions. The obvious example is European law
and aboriginal law in many African countries. 5
Contrarily, by structured mixed legal system, there is some
coordination.46 Such coordination can take different complementary
forms. It could be established by conceptual boundaries (such as private
and public law).47 It could be categorized even within areas where the
overlap is unclear (such as commercial law or procedure). 8
Alternatively, a legal tradition could dominate in certain areas of the law
with legislative pockets of the other legal family.49 Finally, both legal
traditions may coexist under a process of mutual recognition of
structured boundaries and sources."
Structured mixed legal systems can be pluralist (usually dualist)
or hybrid.5 By pluralist, we envisage the case where the different legal
families operate side by side, in well-defined contained areas of the law. 2
For example, private law follows the civil law tradition whereas public
law follows the common law tradition. 3 By hybrid, we consider the
possibility of blending together those legal traditions. 4 A possibility is
42 See Mattei, supra note 39, at 7-8.
43 GLENN, supra note 40, at 5.
44 Id. at 2-3.
41 See generally JEANMARIE FENRICH, PAOLO GALIZZI & TRACY HIGGINS, THE FUTURE OF
AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW (2011); see, e.g., Phil Bartle, African and European Law in Ghana,
AKAN STUDIES (last visited Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.scn.org/rdi/kw-law.htm.
46 GLENN, supra note 40, at 5.
41 Id. at 2.
41 Id. at 6.
49 Id. at 13.
'0 Id. at 15.
51 See ESIN OROCO, General Introduction: Mixed Legal Systems at New Frontiers, in MIXED
LEGAL SYSTEMS ATNEW FRONTIERS 1,1 (2010).
52 Id. at 4.
"' Id. at 3-4.
14 Id. at 2-4.
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that contract law, or more generally private law, combines both common
and civil law doctrines.5
The terminology in comparative law is not without problems. In
fact, some comparativists have criticized the standard vocabulary. For
example, legal scholars refer to "mixed jurisdictions" when they use
common and civil law traditions, rather than "mixed legal systems" as
would be more appropriate 6.5 The term "mixed jurisdictions" seems to
presuppose a degree of hybridism which is usually absent. 7 The term
"mixed legal systems" anticipates legal pluralism which seems more
frequent than hybridism. 8
In this paper we focus on structured mixed legal systems, in
particular those that use both the common and the civil law traditions.
Table 1 summarizes the jurisdictions we are considering. Notice that
some relevant cases have been excluded from Table 1 (based on the work
of comparativists) but can be easily framed in the context of our model.
They are Japan, Korea, and Taiwan that were pure civil law jurisdictions
(all of German tradition) and have now been influenced by the US
common law system. 9 We could add Hong Kong as a common law
tradition now under the influence of Chinese law (which loosely
speaking could be considered in the civil law tradition).6" The European
Union is a completely different case that blends the different civil law
traditions with some elements of the common law (due to the United
Kingdom, Ireland, and more recently Malta and Cyprus).61
There is no formal model of mixed jurisdiction to the same
extent that there is no formal model of common law or civil law.62 Any
jurisdiction incorporating elements from both legal traditions has
developed a particular institutional feature that makes any mixed system
unique. In fact, jurisdictions of a mixed legal family were not originally
55 See Vernon Valentine Palmer, Two Rival Theories of Mixed Legal Systems, in MIXED LEGAL
SYSTEMS AT NEW FRONTIERS 19,45-47 (Esin Oricil ed., 2010).
56 See id. at 20-21.
57 Id. at 26-35.
" Id. at 35-36.
59 See ODA, supra note 20, at 1 (discussing the particular case of Japan).
6o See Peter Wesley-Smith, The Content of the Common Law in Hong Kong, in THE NEW LEGAL
ORDER IN HONG KONG 9, 10 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1999); see RANDALL PEERENBOOM,
CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 7-8 (2002).
61 See generally PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BORCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 4
(5th ed. 2011); see also Vernon Valentine Palmer, Two Rival Theories of Mixed Legal Systems,
in MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS AT NEW FRONTIERS, supra note 56, at 45-47.
62 See PALMER, supra 29, at 5-6; Hein Kotz, The Value of Mixed Legal Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV.
435, 435 (2003).
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founded as such.63 Their mixed nature is the product of a later change.
Following the insights of a famous legal scholar, we could define these
jurisdictions as "basically a civilian system that had been under pressure
from the Anglo-American common law and has in part been overlaid by
that rival system of jurisprudence." The civil law is not necessarily the
original legal tradition (since many of these countries had some
aboriginal or indigenous law before European colonization), but it was
implemented before the arrival of British common law. 5
All jurisdictions in Table 1 are fundamentally dualist (the first
column) or pluralist (the remaining columns).66 They have a legal system
with a dual foundation. A large proportion of substantive law and
procedure can be distinctly traced back to civil or common law systems.67
Generally speaking, private law seems to be of civil tradition whereas
public law (administrative, criminal, and constitutional) comes from
Anglo-American influence.68 The main reason is, broadly speaking, the
earlier development of private law and later development of public law.69
Legal scholars have traced the combination of civil and common
law back to two distinct possible historical reasons 0:
(i) intercolonial transfer (losses from France, Spain, the
Netherlands, or the Ottoman Empire; gains to Britain or the
United States).7 There is usually little influence of Anglo-
American law before the transfer of sovereignty." The transfer of
sovereignty usually results from an event unrelated to the legal
system (for example, war).73 The new dominant political actor is
established in a strong position but avoids or fails to effectively
impose the common law because of a large non-Anglophonic
63 Kotz, supra note 62, at 435; PALMER, supra note 29, at 4-6.
64 PALMER, supra note 29, at 7 (providing a general definition by Sir Thomas Smith in 1965 having
the case of Scotland in mind); T.B. Smith, The Preservation of the Civilian Tradition in "Mixed
Jurisdictions ", in CIVIL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 2, 2-3 (A.N. Yiannopoulos, ed., 1965).
65 See PALMER, supra 29, at 4.
66 See id at 7-8.
67 id.
68 Id. at 9-10.
69 See id. at 55.
'0 Id. at 19.
7t PALMER, supra note 29, at 19; see generally PATRICK BALFOUR KINROSS, THE OTTOMAN
CENTURIES: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE 595-609 (1979).
72 PALMER, supra note 29, at 19.
71 See id at 19-20.
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community that is socially and economically dominant (but not
politically).74 The English speaking community initially is a
minority that communicates in a different language that does not
dominate the life of the jurisdiction.75 Still, this English minority
shapes the political process.76 Not surprisingly, the common law
expands due to a well-developed colonial administration and the
local (business) interests of the small English speaking
community.77
For example, consider the case of Malta.78 Private law is
essentially dominated by the civil law tradition but administrative
and constitutional law is inevitably English.79 Legal scholars have
explained the enactment of Maltese codes in the nineteenth
century as a mechanism to achieve consistency between the
influence of Italian law and the realities of the political connection
to Britain."0 As a consequence, the pure civil law tradition has
been blended with the practice of English oriented sources.
However, even today, the combination of common and civil law
is fundamentally more practical than doctrinal and fully
theorized.8
Scholars can also use this model to understand Japan, Korea, and
Taiwan. They were initially influenced by German law after the
reforms enacted following the Meiji restoration.82 The American
14 Id. at 21-22.
" Id. at41-42.
76 See id. at 42.
77 See PALMER, supra note 29, at 42-43. Such constraint could explain why Spanish civil law faded
away in Florida, Texas or California, Dutch civil law in New York and German (Japanese) civil
law in the Mariana Islands, but not in South Africa, Louisiana, Quebec, Puerto Rico, Malta and
the Philippines. See David Carey Miller, South Africa: A Mixed System Subject to Transcending
Forces, in STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: MIXED AND MIXING 165, 165 (Esin Oriicit, Elspeth
Attwooll & Sean Coyle eds., 1996) (discussing the case pertaining to South Africa).
78 See Joseph M. Ganado, Malta: A Microcosm of International Influences, in STUDIES IN LEGAL
SYSTEMS: MIXED AND MIXING 225, 225 (Esin Ortic0i, Elspeth Attwooll & Sean Coyle eds.,
1996).
'9 Id. at 229.
80 Id.
8' Id. at 225.
82 See Hideki Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reexamining Legal Transplants: The Director's
Fiduciary Duty in Japanese Corporate Law, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 437, 437
(Daniel H. Foote, ed,, 2007). Japan influenced legal reforms in Korea since the 1870s. Korea was
Efficiency of the Common Law
occupation after WWII promoted important legal reforms in Japan
and Korea (the anti-monopoly laws being the standard example).83
Taiwan's history after 1949 induced an approximation to the
United States that had consequences in later legal reforms. 4 These
jurisdictions combine an important civil law tradition of German
influence with fundamental reforms of American origin.85 There is
no formal intercolonial transfer, but these countries were under
the sphere of a civil law jurisdiction in the first stage of legal
reform and, due to later political changes, came under the sphere
of a common law jurisdiction. 6
Israel provides another example of this approach.87 The Ottoman
influence explains the prevalence of German civil law in the
region.88 The British Mandate for Palestine established in the early
1920s brought the common law to this area of the world. 9 The
coexistence of civil and common law was noticeable by the time
Israel became independent in 1948.90 Waves of immigration with
lawyers who transferred from different legal origins reflected
different experiences.9 The intercolonial transfer was reinforced
by a significant change of the composition of the population, in
particular lawyers.92
(ii) merger of sovereignties (mainly Scotland): the Act of Union
of 1707 keeps strict separation between Scottish and English
formally annexed by Japan in 1910. Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895. See generally W. G.
BEASLEY, JAPANESE IMPERIALISM 1894-1945 43-44, 90, 142 (1991).
83 See ODA, supra note 20, at 20-21; see also YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, ASIAN LEGAL
REVIVALS: LAWYERS IN THE SHADOW OF THE EMPIRE, 49-61, 102-04 (2010).
84 See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
ASIAN CASES 106-57 (2003).
85 Seee.g., Kanda & Milhaupt, supra note 82, at 437.
86 id.
87 See Yoram Shachar, History and Sources of Israeli Law, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
ISRAEL 1, 1 (Amos Shapira, ed. & Keren C. DeWitt-Arac assoc. ed., 1995); see generally
MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAW AND CULTURE OF ISRAEL (2011).
88 See Shachar, supra note 87, at 1.
89 Id. at 4.
9' Id. at 5.
9' Id. at 2.
92 Id.
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law.93 Scottish private law is respected but the Union effectively
merges public law and public institutions.94 The new political and
judicial institutions promoted the reception of English law,
although it is debatable if the combination of legal traditions was
already there before the Union due to trade, political and
economic influence.95
The importance of precedent with binding effect even in areas of
traditional civil law has been recognized as the main source to
combine substantive civil law with a common law approach in
Scotland.96 However, some areas have been largely immune to
legislative incursion from English law unless absolutely necessary
(such as criminal or family law).97 Legal scholars mention the
Scottish examples as a unique voluntarily combination of civil
and common law that struggles for legal consistency.98
The European Union can be discussed in the context of this
model. Strictly speaking, the European Union created a new legal
order independent of the Member-states.99 However, the law of
the European Union has to be enforced and applied by national
courts subject to a complex institutional framework (including the
principle of supremacy of European Union law).' ° Inevitably,
these national courts reflect their own traditions and practices.'0 '
Therefore, European Union law combines elements of common
law and civil law in response to the ongoing need of improving
and balancing a new legal order.0 2 The European Union is not,
93 PALMER, supra note 29, at 29; see ROBIN M. WHITE & IAN D. WILLOCK, THE SCOTTISH LEGAL
SYSTEM 26-28 (4th ed., 2006); BRYAN CLARK, SCOTTISH LEGAL SYSTEM 4-6 (2d ed., 2009).
94 PALMER, supra note 29, at 29.
95 See also PALMER, supra note 29, at 29; SMITS, supra note 16, at 12-13 (making the point that it
is unclear if Scottish law is a consistent mix or a confusing interaction of common and civil law
while, for example, South African law is more consistent. Furthermore, according to the author,
it is unclear if Scottish courts improve the mix or dilute the internal structure of some areas of the
law).
96 See Elspeth Attwooll, Scotland: A Multi-Dimensional Jigsaw, in STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS:
MIXED AND MIXING 17, 27 (Esin Orticii, Elspeth Attwooll, & Sean Coyle eds., 1996).
97 PALMER, supra note 29, at 29.
98 Id
99 See CRAIG & BURCA, supra note 61.
1OO Id.
1"1 Id.
102 Id.
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strictly speaking, a merger of sovereignties, but the institutional
arrangement reflects a similar process due to the impeding
incompleteness of a recent legal order that requires the
cooperation of national courts. °3
As noted by legal scholars, when coded, the incumbent civil law
is likely to be more resistant to common law influence."° We can use the
French or Spanish experiences when compared to the Dutch group to
provide an illustration.0 5
In most cases of mixed legal systems around the world, there are
significant common elements that have been identified by comparativists
to explain the patterns of development of a mixed legal family.'0 6 The
most immediate is language as we have already mentioned. Usually there
is a linguistic factor that requires, at least in early stages, that the law be
in a language different from English.' °7
A second aspect is the influence of Anglo-American law on legal
institutions and procedure which is usually determined by the political
power of the English-speaking community.'08 Examples include powerful
courts, influential judges, some form of stare decisis where judicial
decisions are accepted as a source of law (de facto or de jure) and bind
inferior courts (in a much less flexible way than the Spanish doctrina
jurisprudencial or the French jurisprudence constante), and assimilation
of common law rules of civil procedure (although usually with no formal
separation between common law and equity). 9
A third element is the slow penetration of common law in the
context of private law. According to legal scholars, the patterns of
common law influence in private law are usually the following: some in
torts, less so in contracts, even less in quasi-contracts and unjust
enrichment, very little to none in property."0 Commercial law tends to
103 Id.
104 See PALMER, supra note 29, at 6.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 41.
100 See id. at 21-22.
109 See PALMER, supra note 29, at 45-48. See WILLIAM M. ROBINSON, JUSTICE IN GREY: A
HISTORY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA 45, 80-81
(1941) (explaining that the distinction between common law and equity was eliminated in the
Confederate States of America, in 1861, because it was considered unjustified given the civil law
tradition of many Southern states).
11o PALMER, supra note 29, at 57-59.
Vol 29, No. 4
Wisconsin International Law Journal
adhere to common law more easily, generally not by imposition but due
to self-interested economic reasons and the inadequacy of the old civil
law."
III. THE ECONOMIC MODEL
As we discussed in the previous section, comparative law has
identified general patterns of development of a mixed legal family. Civil
law arrives first due to the initial colonization or political influence (in
the case of Scotland)." 2 Common law follows after some transfer of
sovereignty."3 Common law is not developed because the local
community is unsatisfied with civil law, but due to political and military
reasons." 4 Not surprisingly, common law dominates legal institutions,
procedure and public law."' However, common law does not easily
penetrate private law." 6
Public law depends mostly on political or constitutional
decisions."7 Often a mixed system follows a common law pattern in
criminal law, judicial proceedings, or administrative matters."' This is
the case of mixed jurisdictions within a constitutional framework based
on common law such as the American Southern states, Puerto Rico,
Israel, or Scotland."9 The opposite tends to happen within the European
Union, where the United Kingdom and Ireland are subject to legislative
proceedings drafted according to the civilian tradition.2 °
Public law responds less immediately to individual incentives
and decisions, but more to the political arrangements. 2' From this
perspective, the imposition of common law structures has less to do with
the evolution to efficiency resulting from the competition of different
Id. at 66-67.
12 Id. at 5.
"3 Id. at 18-19.
114 See id. at 20-22.
". See id. at 62-67.
116 Seeid. at 67.
117 Id. at 9-10.
118 Id.
"9 See id. at 25-31.
12o See Jan Smits, A European Private Law as Mixed Legal System, 5 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. &
COMP. L. 328, 329 (1998); see Mathias Reimann, Towards a European Civil Code: Why
Continental Jurists Should Consult Their Transatlantic Colleagues, 73 TuL. L. REv. 1337, 1337
(1999).
121 See PALMER, supra note 29, at 9-10.
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legal systems; it is more easily explained by the political influence of the
legal tradition of the dominant power."'
The challenge comes from private law. We wonder why civil
law survives when the legislature as well as the judiciary follow common
law principles. According to the legal origins literature"2 , transition to
common law should follow mature economic growth. 24 In fact, the legal
origins literature strongly recommends adopting common law principles
in private law in order to enhance economic growth. 25 It seems that the
mixed jurisdictions remain under civilian tradition for two possible
reasons. One explanation is due to their current poor economic progress.
Therefore, there is no pressure to change their legal system in the area of
private law. A second reason is the limitations derived from their rigid
civilian framework which precludes change. If the legal origins thesis is
correct, mixed jurisdictions governed by common law principles should
opt into the common law at a particular stage of economic growth.126
Additionally, such mixed jurisdictions are embedded in a common law
institutional framework, as a consequence of common law governing
public institutions and their proceedings, and therefore are expected to
recognize the importance of judicial precedent (unknown in pure civil
law systems). 27
An immediate explanation for the observed pattern could be
mere path dependence. 2 ' In other words, mixed legal families are still in
a process of transformation.'29 Common law will eliminate civil law in
some distant future much the same way it has happened in some
American Southern states.3 ' The reason for this delay would be the
codification of civil law principles in many of those jurisdictions
described in Table 1. Codification bolsters civil law and therefore
reinforces path dependence. 3' The problem with this explanation is that
122 Id. at 20.
123 See La Porta et al., supra note 1, at 285.
124 See id. at 286.
125 See id. at 286, 310, 321.
126 See id. at 327.
127 See PALMER, supra note 29, at 45-50.
128 See generally Garoupa & G6mez Ligtierre, supra note 7, at 296; Garoupa & G6mez Ligoerre,
supra note 14, at 16.
129 See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICAN 152 (3d ed., 2007).
130 See PALMER, supra note 29, at 21-22;
131 See PALMER, supra note 29, at 88, 208, 260-61, 331, 371, 428-29.
VoL 29, No. 4
Wisconsin International Law Journal
legal scholars do not detect such a trend in those jurisdictions. Civil law
seems to be there permanently.
Absent mere path dependence, if we take literally the legal
origins movement, common law should replace civil law in the areas of
private law.132 Common law is more efficient. Common law is better for
business interests and conducive to economic growth.'33 The persistence
and survival of civil law is, therefore, puzzling. Why would a second-
best legal tradition persist in private law when a first-best legal
alternative is already available in public law?
A possible explanation is that mixed legal families are locked
into an inefficient institutional arrangement and cannot move out."'
There is some market failure that inhibits the common law's ability to
take over civil law in the areas of tort, contracts and property.'35 The
costs of switching are so immensely large that mixed legal families
cannot easily abandon the old civil law and adhere to common law.'36
It is difficult to see what these significant costs could be. Legal
economists have recognized that changing legal regimes has important
disadvantages, but they do not seem to be as significant in this context as
they are in the economic literature of transplants.'37
Following the economic literature on the subject, the list of
possible costs from replacing civil law by common law should include:
(i) Direct cost from acquiring information, importing new rules
and introducing new practices, interpreting and applying them.'
These costs seem less significant when common law has
prevailed already in public law and in procedure.
(ii) Rent-seeking or entrenchment costs from those who
plausibly lose from changing legal rules (long-entrenched
interests) and are willing to waste resources to avoid those
132 See La Porta et al., supra note 1, at 286, 310.
133 Id.
134 See generally Garoupa & G6mez Liguierre, supra note 7; see generally Garoupa & G6mez
Ligiierre, supra note 14.
135 See generally Garoupa & G6mez Liguierre, supra note 7; Garoupa & G6mez Ligtierre, supra
note 14, at 7.
136 See generally Garoupa & G6mez LigUerre, supra note 7; see generally Garoupa & G6mez
Liguerre, supra note 14.
137 See Garoupa & Ogus, supra note 38, at 347.
131 Id. at 345.
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changes (e.g., lawyers or the bar association). 39 These costs
could have been relatively high in early stages when the
jurisdiction was dominated by a non-Anglophonic community,
but surely they must have been reduced as English influence
expanded; lawyers are usually educated in both legal traditions,
so there is no obvious reason to fear loss of rents to a competing
or alternative legal profession.
(iii) Indirect costs due to the potential loss of legal coherence,
consistency, network effects and potential development of
contradictions and instability within the emergent law. 4 In this
context, overall legal coherence increases since common law
would dominate both public and private law.
(iv) Private legal order costs by limiting individual benefits from
opting-out of the current legal order or developing third-party
arrangements, that is, by imposing public adjustment of the law
which is an imperfect substitute for private adjustment (assuming
that existing arrangements allowed for such adjustment). 4' In our
analysis, replacing civil law by common law presumably
increases flexibility to accommodate private ordering given the
alleged superiority of the common law in this respect.4 '
Alternatively, the introduction of common law would facilitate
the malleability of the legal system given the general perception
that case law is more flexible to local preferences.
(v) Lack of innovation costs since systems without local
variations are less likely to innovate and adjust to dynamic
preferences."' Comparing the current patterns of legal
innovation in mixed legal families with the pure common and
civil law jurisdictions, this lack of innovation cost does not seem
very significant.
'3 See Garoupa & Ogus, supra note 38, at 345; see also Anthony Ogus, Competition Between
National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis to Comparative Law, 48 INT'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 405,411 (1999).
140 Garoupa & Ogus, supra note 38, at 345; see also Anthony Ogus, The Economic Basis of Legal
Culture: Networks and Monopolization, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 419, 420, 434 (2002).
141 Garoupa & Ogus, supra note 38, at 345.
142 See Garoupa & G6mez Liguerre, supra note 7, at 295-96.
143 See Garoupa & Ogus, supra note 38, at 346.
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(vi) Subsequent costs of adjustment and administrative costs on
the production of more law when transplants deviate from
indigenous law.1" Given that a mixed legal system is being
replaced by a pure common law system, it is unclear how costs
of future adjustments and more law can be significantly
increased.
(vii) Potential costs due to coordination failure derived from the
presence of strategic externalities or the public good nature of
transplanting.'45 This could be a significant problem if the switch
from civil law to common law is left to the market. However, in
all these jurisdictions, there is a central government that was able
to impose common law on areas of legal institutions, public law
and procedure. Presumably the same central government could
easily internalize these externalities, solve the public good
under-provision of legal change, and consequently impose
common law in the area of private law.
(viii) Transaction costs resulting from harmonization and legal
unification.'46 Although these costs could be relevant given the
entrenchment of civil law codification, they should be less
significant than in a situation of legal transplanting from a
different jurisdiction given the existing pluralism.
After reviewing all the possible costs from switching from civil
law to common law, our conclusion can only be that it is unlikely that
mixed legal families are merely locked into an inefficient arrangement
that cannot easily change. We are not suggesting that these costs are
nonexistent or irrelevant. Nevertheless, we are not persuaded that these
costs are so significant as to lock in mixed legal jurisdictions and justify
their considerable loss of efficiency and economic growth.
'44 See Peter Grajzl & Valentina Dimitrova-Grajzl, The Choice in the Lawmaking Process: Legal
Transplants vs. Indigenous Law, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 615, 617 (2009), available at
http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol5/iss1/art26.
145 See Garoupa & Ogus, supra note 38, at 346; Emanuela Carbonara & Francesco Parisi, Choice of
Law and Legal Evolution: Rethinking the Market for Legal Rules, 139 PUB. CHOICE 461, 462
(2009).
146 See Garoupa & Ogus, supra note 38, at 339; Emanuela Carbonara & Francesco Parisi, The
Paradox of Legal Harmonization, 132 PUB. CHOICE 367, 367 (2007).
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As with the economic literature on transplants, the only
reasonable explanation has to be related to preferences. Preferences
(understood as legal culture, tradition, and social inclination for a
particular legal family) are the standard explanation for the prevalence of
different legal systems.'47 In the legal transplant literature, the standard
argument is that cultural, political, and social preferences might explain
why jurisdictions do not switch their legal regime.'48
In order for the story about preferences to be consistent with the
legal origins movement, it has to be the following. Even though the new
legal regime (after transplant) is more conducive of economic growth, a
particular jurisdiction could be willing to sacrifice (economic)
effectiveness in order to maintain a legal regime more consistent with
cultural preferences.'49 Therefore, in the absence of significant switching
costs, different legal families persist because preferences undermine
legal unification in an inefficient way. 5°
Sacrificing efficiency (in the sense of an economically better
legal regime) due to cultural preferences seems unrealistic in the context
of mixed legal families. Presumably initial preferences for a civil law
model should be prevailing in private and in public law. Apparently they
were not strong enough to deter change in public law, but they were
powerful enough to undermine transformation in private law. Yet,
several generations later, the same preferences are unchanged and
uncontaminated by the observation of a superior legal order in public
law.
It seems to us unlikely that the same preferences that support a
more efficient legal regime in one area of the law do not support that
same efficient legal regime in a different area of the law. Therefore, it
seems that preferences are important, but not in the way the legal origins
movement would suggest. Mixed legal families persist because, due to
cultural preferences, switching legal regimes would be less conducive to
economic growth and therefore less efficient. Our argument is that we
cannot separate preferences that generate a particular demand for a legal
147 See, e.g., Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
52, 55 (1996); Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60 MOD. L. REV. 44, 45-46
(1997); PIERRE LEGRAND, FRAGMENTS ON LAW-AS-CULTURE 133-34 (1999); see also SM1TS,
supra 16, 7-10 (citing Pierre Legrand's work against European codification and his
interpretation that such debate reflects the arrogance of common law lawyers convinced of their
superiority over continental lawyers).
148 See PALMER, supra note 29, at 77.
149 See Carbonara & Parisi, supra note 145, at 461, for a more detailed discussion.
1SO id,
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system and the efficiency of that legal system. Under the cultural
preferences that dominate a particular jurisdiction within a mixed legal
system, civil law is likely to be more efficient than common law in the
field of private law.' That is the only plausible explanation for why civil
law has persisted and continues to persist in these jurisdictions.
The argument also sheds light on the Southern American states.
The nature of the switching costs is not different between these
jurisdictions and the ones described on Table 1. It is a matter of dynamic
preferences. The sharp differences concerning legal preferences within
the United States have faded away with time, therefore promoting the
development of common law in the area of private law.'52 In those other
jurisdictions, preferences have not developed in the same way. Most of
these jurisdictions are sovereign states and they are not integrated into a
federal arrangement that induces a particular cultural, political and social
dynamics that favors the prevalence of the Anglo-American elements.'53
And when they are integrated, such as Quebec or Scotland, distinctive
elements of the non-Anglophone community have survived by virtue of a
different language and history.'54
If our theory is correct, and in sharp contrast with the legal
origins movement, forcing mixed legal families to abandon the civil law
aspect in search of the efficiency of the common law would probably be
detrimental for economic growth. In fact, our theory is closer to the so-
called "grafted transplants," that is, successful transplants embedded in
the local context or fused with local norms. 55 Changing the context could
have significant implications for legal reforms that are apparently based
on (in our view, obviously misplaced) efficiency grounds.'56
'5' See Du Plessis, Comparative Law and the Study of Mixed Legal Systems, in THE OxFoRD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 37, at 510 ("[A]s far as the quality of the
mixture is concerned, there is no firm indication that the processes of borrowing in mixed
jurisdictions have generally given rise to law which is particularly good or particularly bad. In
assessing the quality of the mixture, care must be taken not to ascribe change to a single factor,
such as foreign dominance.") (emphasis added).
152 See PALMER, supra note 29, at 21-22.
153 Id.
15 Id.
155 See KITTY CALAVITA, INVITATION TO LAW AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
REAL LAW 92 (2010); see also SMITS, supra note 16, at 10-12 (suggesting mixed legal systems
are an excellent example to inspire European private law).
156 See generally CALAVITA, supra note 155.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides for an economic explanation as to why
mixed jurisdictions persist. Under the efficiency of the common law
hypothesis and the more recent legal origins theory, we should expect
mixed jurisdictions to disappear.'57 If common law is universally
conducive to economic growth, the existence of jurisdictions that keep a
hybrid legal system where private law (that is, the area of the law that
more directly deals with business and investment) is of civil law tradition
is puzzling.
The combination of civil and common law has two historical
reasons: intercolonial transfer (most examples) and merger of
sovereignties (few cases).158 There are a few variations, but generally
private law tends to be codified and entrenched while public law follows
common law.159 Legal institutions are usually transplanted from the
common law colonial power. 6 Such a broad description makes the
existence of mixed jurisdictions more puzzling. They keep an inefficient
legal system for private law (precisely the area of law supposedly more
relevant for economic growth) embedded in institutional arrangements
and public law transplanted from a common law jurisdiction. 6'
We reject path dependence as a convincing explanation given the
political and institutional context. Obviously history is important. We
also recognize that codification encroaches civil law in a nontrivial way.
However, the institutional setup, including the importance of judicial
precedent, is extremely favorable to the development of a common law
approach to private law.'62 It seems unrealistic that a significantly
inefficient form of law persists in an environment already dominated by
the most efficient form of law merely because of some odd path
dependency.
Preferences seem to be a better explanation. In order to be
consistent with the legal origins story, it must be that social preferences
are willing to sacrifice economic growth (induced by the common law)
for the sake of some other goals (presumably better defended by civil
law). However, this argument also seems problematic when those same
157 See La Porta et al., supra note 1, at 286.
' See PALMER, supra note 29, at 19, 29-31.
1'9 Id. at 9-10.
16o Id.
161 See id.
162 See id. at 78-79.
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preferences have already been sacrificed in the area of public law and
legal institutions.
Our explanation does rely on preferences, but with a different
insight. Under the cultural and social preferences that dominate a
particular demand for a legal system, it could be that the mixed
arrangement of civil and common law is more efficient. Therefore, if
common law replaces civil law in the area of private law, it could be less
conducive to economic growth. Unlike the legal origins theory, there is
no single "one-size-fits-all" solution. Mixed legal systems have survived
because the complexities of the legal system illustrate that cultural
preferences matter.
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TABLE 1
Mixed Legal Systems
COMMON & COMMON, COMMON, COMMON,
CIVIL LAW CIVIL & CIVIL & CIVIL &
CUSTOMARY MUSLIM TALMUDIC
BOTSWANA CAMEROUN IRAN ISRAEL
CYPRUS DJIBOUTI JORDAN
GUYANA ERITREA SAUDI
ARABIA
LOUISIANA INDONESIA SOMALIA
MALTA LESOTHO YEMEN
MAURITUS SRI LANKA
NAMIBIA VANATU
PHILLIPPINES ZIMBABWE
PUERTO RICO
QUEBEC
SAINT LUCIA
SCOTLAND
SEYCHELLES
SOUTH
AFRICA
THAILAND
Source: Vernon Valentine Palmer, "Two Rival Theories of
Mixed Legal Systems," in Esin Oriic, Mixed Legal Systems at New
Frontiers, 2010
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